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What’s	next	for	the	AfD?	Three	possible	scenarios
Having	passed	the	electoral	threshold	and	entered	the	Bundestag	for	the	first	time	in	September’s
German	federal	election,	the	AfD	is	now	coming	to	terms	with	the	responsibilities	and	pressures	of
being	a	key	player	in	the	German	parliament.	One	month	on	from	the	election,	Julian	Göpffarth
reflects	on	three	possible	scenarios	for	the	AfD	over	the	coming	years:	that	the	party	will	undergo	a
process	of	nationalist	radicalisation,	that	there	will	be	a	shift	toward	pragmatic	centrism,	and	that	the
moderate	voices	within	the	party	will	become	more	radical	in	their	approach.
	
One	month	after	its	strong	performance	in	the	German	parliamentary	elections,	the	AfD	suffered	its	first	defeat	in
the	Bundestag.	On	24	October	at	a	constituting	plenary	session,	the	newly	elected	MPs	rejected	the	AfD’s
candidate	for	vice-president	of	the	parliament,	Albrecht	Glaser.	As	the	strongest	party,	Merkel’s	CDU	proposed
long-term	Finance	minister	Wolfgang	Schäuble	for	the	presidency	of	the	parliament.	Along	with	the	other	parties’
candidates	for	vice-president,	Schäuble	was	approved	by	a	majority	of	parliamentarians.	Glaser,	however,	was
rejected	in	three	votes	–	a	highly	unusual	event	in	German	politics.
However,	the	rejection	of	Glaser	did	not	come	as	a	surprise.	All	parties	had	announced	their	intentions	to	reject
his	candidacy	in	the	week	prior	to	the	vote.	The	reason:	his	views	on	Islam.	Glaser	believes	that	Islam	is	not	a
religion,	but	a	political	ideology	and	that,	as	a	consequence,	it	should	not	enjoy	the	freedom	of	religion	granted	by
the	German	basic	law.	Yet,	even	in	the	face	of	a	rejection	by	the	other	parties,	the	AfD	insisted	on	Glaser	as	a
candidate.	AfD-leader	Alexander	Gauland	stated	that	Glaser	fully	represents	the	party	line.	Accordingly,	the	party
announced	that	it	would	propose	Glaser	once	more,	despite	the	likelihood	of	another	rejection.	It	appears	that	the
beginning	of	the	AfD’s	experience	in	the	Bundestag	looks	set	to	be	a	continuation	of	the	scandal-driven	way	in
which	the	party	had	campaigned	outside	of	parliament.
Even	if	this	was	only	the	first	parliamentary	session,	it	might	give	a	taste	of	what	to	expect	from	the	AfD	in	the	four
years	to	come.	The	general	view	is	that	the	case	of	Glaser	shows	the	party	is	ready	to	embrace	dissent	rather
than	constructive	solutions.	In	doing	so,	it	hopes	to	highlight	that	it	is	an	alternative	not	only	to	the	government,
but	to	the	whole	of	the	parliament.	The	event	has	also	been	read	as	yet	another	sign	that	the	radical	nationalist
wing	is	currently	in	the	ascendancy	over	the	more	pragmatic,	economically	liberal	wing	of	the	AfD.	But	is	this
separation	of	the	party	into	these	two	rough	camps	a	realistic	representation	of	the	AfD?	Will	the	party	simply
further	radicalise	in	the	future?	Or	will	it,	as	some	hope,	be	tamed	by	the	realities	of	parliamentary	politics?	Here
are	three	possible	scenarios	for	the	future	of	the	party	and	how	likely	they	are.
1.	 Nationalist	radicalisation
Many	have	read	the	AfD’s	behaviour	in	the	first	parliamentary	session	as	a	sign	that	the	party	will	stay	true	to	its
radicalism	and	even	further	radicalise	to	attract	maximum	media	attention.	There	are	some	arguments	for	this
scenario	as	a	majority	of	the	AfD	members	elected	into	the	Bundestag	exhibit	the	conservative	and	even	radical
nationalism	that	seemed	to	have	pushed	out	of	office	the	party’s	first	leader	Bernd	Lucke,	and	most	recently
Frauke	Petry.
The	nationalist	organisations	inside	the	party,	such	as	Der	Flügel	(The	Wing)	or	the	Patriotische	Plattform
(Patriotic	Platform)	are	currently	strong	and	can	be	expected	to	strengthen	their	influence	in	the	Bundestag,	also
because	they	have	the	support	of	AfD-leader	Gauland.	Furthermore,	the	radical	tones	coming	from	the	leadership
of	the	party	during	the	election	campaign	and	the	celebrations	of	its	election	into	parliament	seem	to	indicate	that
the	AfD	is	unlikely	to	become	more	moderate.
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In	the	long	term,	a	stronger	radicalisation	will	most	likely	lead	to	the	defection	of	more	moderate	members.	The
winner	of	such	a	process	would	arguably	be	former	leader	Frauke	Petry.	She	left	the	party	on	the	first	day	after
the	election	and	went	on	to	found	the	party	Die	Blaue	Wende	–	the	blue	turn.	According	to	Petry	this	project	is
supposed	to	be	a	movement	rather	than	a	classical	party	that	merges	the	structure	of	Macron’s	En	Marche	with
an	anti-68	conservatism.	Whether	this	proves	a	promising	model	remains	to	be	seen.	Despite	having	been	joined
by	some	AfD-defectors,	Petry’s	experiment	so	far	seems	to	be	suffering	the	same	fate	as	Lucke’s	post-AfD	party
project	ALPHA.	However,	if	the	AfD	further	radicalises	it	is	not	unlikely	that	more	members	will	defect	and	join	the
more	moderate	Petry-movement.	In	any	case,	one	should	keep	an	eye	on	Petry’s	next	moves.
2.	 A	moderate	shift	toward	pragmatic	centrism
An	alternative	scenario	is	that	the	party	might	be	tamed	by	the	realities	of	parliamentary	life.	The	model	for	this	is
the	Green	party.	According	to	former	Green	party	leader	and	foreign	minister	Joschka	Fischer,	the	Green’s	march
through	the	institutions	in	the	80s	and	90s	changed	the	marchers	far	more	than	the	institutions.	Many	hope	that
this	will	also	be	the	case	for	the	AfD.
Inside	the	party,	this	current	is	represented	by	the	Alternative	Mitte	(Alternative	centre),	which	puts	a	strong
emphasis	on	the	strengthening	of	conservative	and	ordoliberal	values	within	rather	than	against	the	economic
and	democratic	principles	underpinning	the	German	political	system.	The	group	is	often	portrayed	as	the	last
remaining	voice	of	the	AfD’s	initial	form	when	the	party	emerged	as	an	“ordoliberal	alternative”	to	Merkel’s
policies	in	the	Greek	debt	crisis	in	2013.	Over	the	years,	Lucke	and	later	Petry,	came	to	represent	these
principles.	However,	their	demise	reflects	a	continuous	weakening	of	this	approach.
3.	 A	radicalisation	of	the	centre
Finally,	there	is	one	further	scenario:	a	radicalisation	of	the	moderate	voices	inside	the	party.	This	may	be	the
most	likely	scenario,	which	is	illustrated	by	current	AfD	leader	Alice	Weidel,	and	Jörg	Meuthen,	the	AfD’s	leading
man	in	Baden-Württemberg.	Both	were	initially	seen	as	more	moderate	and	liberal	voices	in	the	party.	However,
Weidel’s	radical	rhetoric	during	the	election	campaign	as	well	as	Meuthen’s	strong	links	to	Der	Flügel	clearly
indicate	that	the	general	course	of	the	party	will,	at	least	for	the	foreseeable	future,	not	be	one	of	moderation.
Political	scientist	Cas	Mudde	has	previously	argued	that	what	has	helped	the	rise	of	radical	populist	right	parties
is	their	radicalisation	of	mainstream	views.	In	this	sense	Weidel	and	Meuthen,	as	well	as	long-term	CDU	member
Gauland,	embody	the	AfD	as	a	radicalised	centre.	All	three	come	from	established	backgrounds	and	had
successful	careers	in	business,	academia	and	politics.
In	addition,	as	some	early	studies	show,	the	AfD	has	been	very	successful	in	mobilising	well	educated	and
affluent	voters	who	are	at	least	to	some	extent	part	of	the	national	and	local	elite.	This	indicates	that	what	makes
the	AfD	strong	is	not	its	radicalism	and	populism	per	se,	but	rather	the	way	they	radically	voice	views	that	are	part
of	the	mainstream.	What	provides	common	ground	is	a	nationalism	that	is	based	on	ordoliberal	pragmatism
oriented	towards	the	defence	of	German	economic	interests,	and	expressed	in	opposition	to	European
integration,	as	well	as	a	nationalist	idealism	that	is	reflected	in	the	search	for	a	positive	national	identity,	a	fear	of
cultural	decline	and	a	rejection	of	Islam.
Both	of	these	dimensions	–	the	more	assertive	and	even	partially	radical	nationalism,	and	the	more	pragmatic
German	ordoliberalism	–	place	their	focus	on	“putting	Germany	first”.	They	focus	not	on	opposing,	but	rather	on
complementing	ideological	currents.	While	one	expresses	a	nationalist	attitude	that	is	often	viewed	in	more	widely
accepted	economic	terms,	the	other	does	so	in	a	cultural	and	often	less	politically	correct	manner.	Even	Petry’s
defection	can	be	interpreted	in	this	way.	She	had	to	leave	the	party	not	because	she	fundamentally	disagreed
with	its	direction	in	terms	of	content,	but	rather	in	terms	of	strategy.
This	also	means	that	despite	some	links	to	the	extreme	right,	the	widespread	fear	that	the	AfD	will	turn	into
another	threat	to	German	democracy	misses	the	point.	The	AfD	leadership	and	many	of	its	members	know	that
its	seemingly	Janus-faced	character	is	appealing	(rather	than	appalling)	to	a	large	section	of	conservative
German	centrism.	What’s	more,	despite	the	expectations	of	many	that	with	Petry’s	defection	the	party	would	split
or	descend	into	chaos,	the	AfD	has	so	far	shown	remarkable	inner	coherence	and	a	strong	capacity	to	influence
Germany’s	general	political	discourse.
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While	a	radicalisation	of	the	centre	could	be	the	most	likely	trajectory	for	the	AfD,	the	first	two	scenarios	described
above	should	not	be	discounted.	But	the	development	of	the	party	so	far	has	shown	the	AfD’s	capacity	to	build	a
resilient	ideological	core	by	expressing	mainstream	conservative	views	in	radical	ways.	To	return	to	Fischer	and
the	Green	party,	it	would	be	accurate	to	state	that	the	Greens	are	now	more	mainstream,	established	and
pragmatic	today	than	they	were	in	their	early	years.	However,	it	is	also	true	that	the	German	political	mainstream
has	become	more	Green.	It	is	not	unlikely	that	a	similar	development	will	take	place	with	regard	to	the	AfD.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Elias	Schwerdtfeger	(CC	BY-NC-SA	2.0)
_________________________________
About	the	author
Julian	Göpffarth	–	LSE
Julian	Göpffarth	is	a	PhD	candidate	at	the	London	School	of	Economics.	He	holds	a	degree	in
European	Studies	from	Sciences	Po	Paris	and	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political
Science.	Prior	to	his	PhD,	he	worked	for	the	European	Parliamentary	Research	Service.	His
research	interests	include	nationalist	ideologies,	radicalisation,	European	politics	and	philosophy.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: What’s next for the AfD? Three possible scenarios Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-10-30
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/10/30/whats-next-for-the-afd-three-possible-scenarios/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
